China’s policy communities have argued for continued globalization in the wake of the pandemic in order to help revive China’s economy, expand its global role, and manage the US-China rivalry.

President Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in two propositions—the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road—in late 2013. The BRI is rooted in China’s priorities in the economy, diplomacy, and geostrategy.

Has COVID-19 altered these priorities and China’s interests in globalization? One way of answering the question is to look at the actors and activities that constitute what I call “middle politics,” separate from the “high politics” involving national strategies and the “low politics” pervaded with popular sentiments. Middle politics has been less studied in foreign policy and is typically underreported in news media. In today’s contentious and interdependent world, however, middle politics is robust and pivotal to evaluating globalization’s long-term trend and pinning down its shifting priorities.

This article unpacks the discourse of Chinese analysts and opinion leaders by analyzing policy materials from the following sources: 1) government-sponsored sites that publish policies, speeches, events, industry information, and expert opinions on major policy subjects; 2) popular search engines such as Baidu (the Chinese equivalent of Google) and Zhifu (with subject roundtables); 3) pre-eminent online commercial news sites that publish commentaries; 4) think tanks that offer daily and weekly policy briefs and reposts from other sources. In addition to these venues, influential bloggers on social media sites (Weibo and WeChat) nowadays can shape policy debate and decision-making in China with their large followings. The policy discourses can be categorized into three groups, focusing on geostrategy, diplomacy, and the economy respectively.

Strategic Pessimism and Support for the BRI

“The consensus among China’s geostrategists is notable. On the one hand, they are pessimistic about the future trajectory of US-China relations, driven by hostile high politics and low politics in both countries. On the other hand, they firmly believe that globalization and China’s active participation in the world serve the country’s short- and long-term strategic interests.”

US-China relations have deteriorated continuously since 2009, centering on maritime conflicts in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Taiwan Straits. The bilateral rivalry has further intensified under the Trump administration and expanded into a wide range of matters—trade, technology, intellectual property rights, human rights, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The “new China consensus” in Washington deems Beijing the chief strategic rival to US leadership and the liberal world order, and believes the US needs to rally near- and long-term competition with China in key areas.

COVID-19 has exacerbated the superpower contestation. The Trump administration adopted a largely hostile position against Beijing, as shown in its early imposition of the travel ban on China, the step-up in supply chain “decoupling,” insistently calling COVID-19 the “Chinese virus,” and numerous congressional bills to charge China. In response, China too has adopted a confrontational approach. Against each anti-China move in Washington, Beijing has fired back and stressed America’s failure to contain the virus.

In a widely circulated speech, renowned scholar and strategist Wang Jisi observed that, although the pre-COVID relationship between China and the United States had been pretty bad, Chinese policy communities largely viewed the bilateral relationship as central to China’s foreign policy. “Now,” he found, “the mainstream view has become ‘tit for tat’ and ‘willing to show force.’” To break this strategic impasse, Wang argued that China should do more for world stability through the BRI and globalization platforms, but not seek, unrealistically, a coalition against the US.

Peking University professor Jia Qingguo was deeply pessimistic regarding the U.S-China rivalry. Since a stable working relationship between China and the US has been critical to existing institutions such as G7, G20, IMF, and the United Nations, he was also concerned about the global order in the post-COVID world. The two countries had managed to cooperate to address the 2008 global financial crisis, the 2014 Ebola outbreak, and the 2015 climate change negotiations, strengthening global institutions and the global order, he noted. However, due to US deglobalization and US-China decoupling, “2020 is destined to be a year of misfortunes,” he warned. However, he continued, irrespective of changes in the US and US-China relations, China needs to be actively engaged in the global fight against COVID-19.

The consensus among China’s geostrategists is notable. On the one hand, they are pessimistic about the future trajectory of US-China relations, driven by hostile high politics and low politics in both countries. On the other hand, they firmly believe that globalization and China’s active participation in the world serve the country’s short- and long-term strategic interests. As in 2013, when the geostrategic motivation to avoid US-China conflicts in Maritime Asia helped drive the Belt and Road, the strategists, now worried about the US-China escalation into a “hot war,” have welcomed efforts in maintaining globalization under the BRI and beyond. These efforts include diplomacy and aid in African countries and Central Asia, renewed investment negotiation with European economies, and cooperation with Asian neighbors.

Diplomatic Ambition and China’s New Role in the World

“…diplomatic ambition is demonstrated by researchers and scholars that have affiliations with government or government-funded think tanks, as well as nationalist entrepreneurs. They have confidence in the future trajectory of multilateral governance and China’s leadership role in it.”

The second group consists of scholars and researchers with varying degrees of government connections. Their writing exhibits China’s rising diplomatic ambition. Many of them, or their institutions, were involved in making and implementing the BRI policy in recent years. They are optimistic about China’s collaboration with other countries, its ability to lead in various global fora, and its advantage in technology and public health issues.

The optimists were particularly salient in late March, when China curbed the COVID-19 pandemic, and by contrast, Europe and America experienced rapid deterioration. Because of this turn of events, optimists were eager to advocate for China’s stronger leadership in world health, global economy, and diplomacy. Gu Xueming, a researcher at the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM), and Ren Lin at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) published a policy brief in China Daily, “Fight Against Virus to Boost Globalization.” “The pandemic could necessitate an adjustment in the international economic landscape, as advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data are to play significant roles in the prevention and treatment of novel coronavirus pneumonia,” they wrote. China can use its advantage in these technologies to expand their use in BRI projects.

In a separate essay in China Daily, “On the Mend,” Ren argued that in response to the COVID outbreak, China has demonstrated that it can play a meaningful role in improving global health governance. It should increase its influence in global health affairs by “actively engaging global governance,” and promote reform of the global health governance system, Ren argued.

He Yafei, Director of the Global Governance Research Center at Renmin University and the former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, offered a lengthy discussion of COVID-19’s impact on China’s diplomacy. While recognizing the damage to US-China relations, he claimed that China’s response to the crisis has helped it gain more global networks and potential influence.  He argued that in view of the “China-bashing” led by the United States, “China should take the high road” and work with international actors to eradicate the “governance deficit” in the world and support the roles of WHO and other global organizations.

Huang Renwei, Vice Dean of the Fudan University School of One Belt and One Road and Global Governance, published a piece in March underscoring the opportunities presented by COVID-19 to facilitate China’s participation and leadership in global governance. Huang explained that China could boost its global image by highlighting the “sacrifice” that Chinese people made in stopping the contagion. Furthermore, to win international understanding, China needs to be open about its shortcomings in governance and mistakes that it made in the initial handling of the outbreak. By sharing lessons that it learned from these mistakes with other countries, China could “mend” its international image. Finally, Huang urged China to respect the WHO’s expertise and guidelines, and expand WHO’s roles in the future management of the health crisis. “Multilateralism, not unilateralism, is China’s consistent position,” he argued.

Among the optimists, some praise China’s superior political ideology and system. In an article titled, “Xi Jinping is a Good Emperor,” private entrepreneur Eric Li wrote that the COVID crisis is the testing ground of different political systems, governance structures, and cooperation mechanisms. China’s COVID-19 response demonstrates its advantageous system. Another private fund manager confirmed that, although China was slow in disclosing the virus in the beginning, once the science on the virus became apparent, the Party leadership ordered the whole country to stop working at once.

In May, optimists seemed to gain more strength in Beijing, driven by the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization and China’s return to political life. In a CASS publication, researchers mapped out future scenarios in the world and how China should respond in each scenario.

In summary, diplomatic ambition is demonstrated by researchers and scholars that have affiliations with government or government-funded think tanks, as well as nationalist entrepreneurs. They have confidence in the future trajectory of multilateral governance and China’s leadership role in it. Some have a vested interest in the BRI strategy and have advocated greater connections between China and the BRI region. Others have a more nationalist bent, observing China’s strength in its political system, governance structure, and crisis management. However, in all, the optimists are globalists and advocate for a more active role for China in world affairs in the future. They are also pragmatic in identifying sectors that have the potential for China to play more substantial roles in the post-COVID world.

Economic Pragmatism and the BRI

The third group is the largest and consists of actors involved in the economy and diplomacy. As a whole, they are not as pessimistic as the strategists who focus on US-China relations, nor as ambitious as the second group seeking China’s expansion in the post-COVID world. They view post-COVID China and the world to be deeply troubled and challenged. For China to actively and effectively rescue itself, it has to help others tackle the challenge too.

Writing about the probability of a global recession, Hu Biliang, Professor at Beijing Normal University, argued that China should work within the G20 to collaborate and provide a monetary stimulus. Second, it should reduce tariffs and barriers to ensure the stability of supply chains. Finally, it should use the Belt & Road mechanism to enhance financial coordination and prevent regional and global financial crises.

In a popular blog, followed by 330 million readers, the anonymous blogger explained why China should assist foreign countries fighting the coronavirus. He wrote, “They are foreigners, but they are consumers of goods made in China,” pointing to the manufacturing sector’s dependency on export markets. Further, in high-end medical supplies and equipment, China is dependent on more advanced suppliers in the US and Europe. “Should production in the advanced countries experience a halt, Chinese patients will suffer.” Finally, the blogger wrote that viruses do not stop at borders, and they do not disappear. “If China does not join the world to rid of the disease, it will come back to China.”

The logic of interdependence is clear in MOFCOM researcher Mei Xinyu’s argument for China’s active assistance in European countries’ fight against the pandemic. He provided two reasons. First, there is a significant number of Chinese people living there. Helping the host society recover helps overseas Chinese people, thus preventing the influx of returnees at this critical moment. Second, helping foreign countries fight the coronavirus will enhance relationships with foreign firms in China. These foreign companies are an integral part of the Chinese economy, and they care about their home countries’ well-being.

Pragmatists underscore severe economic and diplomatic challenges that China is going to face after the pandemic. On the one hand, China’s economy cannot succeed without the global economy’s recovery. On the other hand, it will face enormous diplomatic challenges after COVID-19, particularly in advanced societies, making economic recovery in China and the world even more difficult. Hence, pragmatists argue that China should conduct robust multilateral efforts to fight the global pandemic and help other countries. Staying global and staying multilateral, in the pragmatists’ view, is needed for China to revive the economy from the recession and rebuild diplomatic space abroad.

China’s policy communities—pessimists, optimists and pragmatists—have argued for continuity of the BRI, and of globalization more generally, to manage the US-China rivalry, expand China’s global role, and help China revive its economy. To what extent China heeds their advice remains to be seen.

This essay is adapted from the article “The Belt and Road after Covid-19: Actors and Activities in Globalizing China,” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (forthcoming January 2021).

Min Ye is Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston University. Her specializations include Chinese political economy, China and India comparison, East Asian international relations, and globalization with a focus on transnational immigration and foreign investment. Her most recent book is The Belt, Road and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China 1998-2018.